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Abstract
This paper discusses the relation between characteristics of the evaluating manager and the
way performance measurement and evaluation information is used. First a discussion is provided
about the dependent variable. It is recognized that categorization into archetypes (e.g., evaluative
styles) is unsatisfactory. Instead the information content/emphasis dimensions financial-non-
financial, quantitative-qualitative, process-outcome, past-future and external-internal, along
with the dimension flexibility-rigidity of information usage are proposed.
An investigation is made of the relation between the scores on those dimensions and char-
acteristics of the evaluator. Managers with an external locus of control are supposed to use less
information in general, but to use more external information, this latter effect may even be so large
that the first effect is obfuscated. Managers with an internal locus of control will particularly em-
phasize non-financial, external, process and future-oriented information. Need for achievement
will increase the amount of information-in particular quantitative and process information-
used and the rigidity with which this information is used. Managers with low tolerance will use
more information, as long as this information is not ambiguous and the source is traditional. This
implies a preference for quantitative and financial information. Risk aversion will result in the us-
age of more information and in particular process oriented information. Managers with previous
experience in the function of the evaluatee will place more emphasis on non-financial and process
information. Finally, managers will pass on the information preferences of their own superiors.
*This research project was made possible by the Limperg  Institute and supervised by Tom Groot and Paul
Jansen. The contribution of the Limperg  Institute and in particular of both supervisors is mentioned with gratitude.
This paper benefitted from comments by Jan Noevennan and participants at the Vrije University Accounting
Seminar.
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1 Introduction
This pattern typically began when a researcher presented new findings
that seemed like a breakthrough solidly based in research. The findings
next became a popular success ana’  were soon used as answers for prob-
lems in all kinds of situations, even in ones to which they had little rele-
vance. Then the$ndings  came generally to be regarded as having failed
[. . , / Finally, the pattern started over again with someone else’s break-
through, as likely as not unrelated to earlier ones, so that progress was
not achieved. Roethlisberger (1977)
The recent hype around the balanced scorecard has given the issue of the dimensions along
which performance measurement and evaluation systems (PMS) are designed and used and in
particular the relative importance of financial and non-financial measures a new impetus. Kap-
lan and Norton [l l-141 emphasize the importance of using both financial and non-financial,
both past and future oriented, both internal and external information and both output and pro-
cess measures in assessing organizational performance. ’ Implicitly, they seem to assume that
all information on the balanced scorecard is quantitative, and in their examples qualitative in-
formation is assessed using quantitative measures. Furthermore, they stress the inter-linkages
between strategy and performance measurement, indicating that ‘the balanced scorecard is most
successful when it is used to drive the process of change’ [ 12, p. 1421.
Kaplan and Norton use an implicit model in which strategy influences both design and us-
age of the balanced scorecard. A more general presentation of a framework describing the
influences on PMS design and usage can be found in Figure 1. This figure indicates that both
design and usage of a PMS are determined by characteristics of the evaluator, characteristics
of the object subject to evaluation, the context of the evaluation and the (not necessarily mul-
tiplicative) interactions between those variables. The emphasis placed on those three factors
will be different for design and usage. Design of the PMS will largely be determined by what
is economically desirable for the organization. The context of the evaluation (e.g., environ-
mental uncertainty, strategy) will be a major influence. Furthermore, the way in which the
system is expected to be used will be important: PMS designers will try to avoid (or correct)
gamesmanship and other dysfunctionalities.
The decisions made by PMS designers will be an important constraint on PMS usage: they
determine what information is available, and possibly even set formal guidelines about how
this information should be used. However, an identical PMS in an identical environment may
be used differently by different evaluators and differences in usage may also be observed for
different objects of evaluation; the usage of PMS will be determined by idiosyncrasies of eval-
uator and evaluatee. Although it traditionally has been claimed that what you measure is what
you get, this point of view mainly concerns the reaction of the evaluatees to the performance
measurement system imposed upon them; they will probably aim at optimizing their evaluation.
This paper will mainly focus on characteristics of the evaluator, a relatively neglected area of
research. First, however, some groundwork needs to be done: the next section will discuss
dimensions along which the usage of a PMS may be characterized.  Next the influence of per-
sonality characteristics and other idiosyncrasies of the evaluator on those dimensions will be
‘Although the authors generally refer to those four ‘perspectives’ adherence to those perspectives is  not deemed
strictly necessary by them: ‘We have yet to see companies using fewer than four perspectives, but, depending on
industry circumstances and a business unit’s strategy, one or more additional perspectives may be needed’ [ 13,
p. 341.
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Figure 1: Performance measurement framework.
discussed. An overview of some problems associated with this line of research will conclude
the paper.
2 Dimensions underlying PMS-usage
The previous section indicated that the context of the evaluation, characteristics of the evaluator
and characteristics of the evaluatee determine the way a PMS is designed and used and pointed
out that context of the evaluation will be particularly important for design decisions, whereas
characteristics of the evaluator will mainly be relevant in assessing how the PMS will finally
be used. Furthermore, it was indicated that design and usage of the PMS mutually influence
each other. However, the question how characteristics of a PMS and PMS usage can be defined,
still has to be answered. It obviously is not a good idea to look at the exact data used, some
abstraction to underlying dimensions is necessary. However, by deciding on using dimensions,
one deviation from other studies in this area is implicitly introduced: the focus is on dimensions
rather than clusters (‘archetypes’). The ‘reliance on accounting performance measures’-studies,
on the contrary, typically follow a general approach introduced by Hopwood [lo]  in which eval-
uative styles are determined. Managers can be characterized  by a budget-constrained style (BC),
a profit-conscious style (PC) and a non-accounting style (NA). In the BC style, subordinates are
evaluated on their ability to meet the budget, whereas in the PC style they are ‘evaluated on the
basis of [their] ability to increase the general effectiveness of [their] unit’s operations in relation
to the long-term purposes of the organization. [.  . . ] For this purpose the accounting data must
be used with some care in a rather flexible manner.’ [lo,  p. 1601.  In the NA style accounting
data are relatively unimportant and are used together with information from other sources.
As indicated in Figure 2, two dimensions apparently underly this classification: empha-
sis on accounting-non-accounting information and flexibility-rigidity. Flexibility is deemed
necessary to compensate for some shortcomings of accounting information mentioned by Hop-
wood: incompleteness due to a lack of comprehensive measures and standards, distortion due to
the fact that an organization’s cost function is not exactly known, concern with outcomes as op-
posed to processes, and emphasis on short-term performance. In Hopwood’s styles the rigidity-
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Figure 2: Evaluative styles and their underlying dimensions
flexibility dimension is only concerned with the usage of accounting information: the fact that
a manager uses not only accounting information but also non-accounting information auto-
matically implies that the accounting information is used flexibly even if the non-accounting
information is used rigidly. Noeverman [ 191  indicates that quantitative non-accounting infor-
mation may have shortcomings similar to those of accounting information. Consequently it is
desirable to apply the rigidity-flexibility to the way performance information in general is used
and not to accounting information alone. This implies that the non-accounting style consists of
two separate styles, one of which will occupy the, now empty, upper-left quadrant of Figure 2.
The recognition of the underlying dimensions instead of the clusters, makes it possible to focus
attention on this problem.
Furthermore, the definition of those styles would imply that evaluative styles really cluster
around some combined scores on both dimensions (as the pseudo-data in Figure 2 do). How-
ever, Hopwood’s results indicate that the budget-constrained and profit-conscious style are not
necessarily mutually exclusive: a style that scores high on both budget emphasis and profit-
consciousness was also found [lo].  In a similar vein, Otley [21]  indicates that his data suggest
a continuum of style, with in his case increasing emphasis on efficiency and decreasing empha-
sis on meeting the budget. It is probably advisable to concentrate research efforts on assessment
of scores on those underlying dimensions. Only in a second stage of research, an attempt can
be made to cluster the scores obtained and determine the characteristics of an evaluative style.
The dimensions recognized thus far, can be found in the first two stubs of Table 1. Apart
from an accounting-non-accounting, also a quantitative-qualitative dimension is recognized.
Those dimensions show overlap by definition, as accounting information is automatically quan-
titative information (obviously, the reverse is not automatically the case). The flexibility-
rigidity dimension is somewhat different from the other dimensions recognized as it bears no
direct relation to the content of the information provided, whereas the other dimensions are
partially constrained by this factor.
As indicated in the introductory section of this paper, the balanced scorecard papers [ 1 l-
141,  although implicitly, also recognize  a number of dimensions on which PMS usage can be
scored.2  A first dimension is financial-non-financial, which maps neatly on the accounting-
non-accounting dimension of Hopwood.  Furthermore, the dimensions past-future, which also
*Kaplan and Norton focus on the provision, rather than the usage of information. For the recognition of
underlying dimensions this difference is not important.
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paper dimensions recognized
Hopwood [ lo] accounting-non-accounting
flexibility-rigidity
outcome-process
short-term-long-term
Noeverman [ 191 quantitative-qualitative
flexibility-rigidity
Kaplan and Norton [ 1 l-141 financial-non-financial
past-future
internal-external
outcome-process
Table 1: Dimensions underlying PMS usage.
implies long-term-short-term, internal-external and outcome-process are recognized,3  those
dimensions can also be found in Table 1. Kaplan and Norton treat the latter three dimensions as
correlated with the financial-non-financial dimension. Financial information is concerned with
the past, is internal, and focuses on output. Non-financial information is also future-oriented,
external and also focuses on processes. In this world view, the usage of financial information
requires flexibility, whereas the usage of non-financial information allows for rigidity. The
absolute categorization  of Kaplan and Norton, however, seems difficult to defend. It is more
prudent to treat the four dimensions separately, recognizing  that they may be correlated.
Although the dimensions recognized may not be unique-+mpirical research on the di-
mensionality of information usage is clearly needed-they reflect a certain consensus about
which dimensions are deemed to be most important, probably because of a presumed relation
to quality of decision making and organizational performance. One complementary dimen-
sion should be mentioned: the amount of information attended to. Other possible dimensions
such as tightness of control and formality of PM.5  usage seem to map reasonably well on the
flexibility-rigidity dimension.
The discussion in this section has provided an overview of the dimensions underlying the
provision and usage of information in the context of a PMS, as recognized in the major studies
on this topic. In the next section, I will investigate how the amount of information used and the
scores on those dimensions can be explained; an attempt to define so-called evaluative styles
will not be made.
3 Characteristics of the evaluator
An important characteristic of the evaluator evidently, is the position this person occupies in
the organization. However, generally the evaluator will be one level up in the organization
compared to the evaluatee. The absolute level at which the evaluator is found, is not deemed
to be directly important in the determination of PMS characteristics. More important are the
idiosyncrasies of the evaluators themselves. The next subsections will subsequently discuss
locus of control, need for achievement, ambiguity tolerance, and risk taking propensity. Next,
3Chenhall and Morris [3]  use the label ‘scope’ to indicate the extent to which information is external, non-
financial and future-oriented.
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two miscellaneous characteristics of the evaluator-experience in the domain of the evaluatee
and the way the evaluator is evaluated (although the latter variable may be considered a context
rather than an evaluator-related factor)-will be discussed.
3.1 Locus of control
Locus of control (LoC)  can be defined as the tendency of a person to attribute outcomes to
internal or external causes. Persons with an internal LoC tend to attribute successes or fail-
ures to their own efforts, whereas persons with an external LoC  tend to attribute those same
outcomes to circumstances beyond their control. Therefore, one would theoretically expect
that individuals with an external LoC  will desire less information than internals, as according
to their world view outcomes are beyond their control and consequently this information is of
no use for them. This effect is strengthened by the observation that internals are more able to
process information and to decide which information they need [7].  Consequently, internals
will use more information and are able to use more complicated information.4  An empirical
study [7]  on differences in the valuation of information between internals and externals, how-
ever, shows unexpected results: externals value information more than internals do. A possible
explanation is that externals require more information in order to defend their attributions or
find circumstances to which they may attribute their successes or failures.
A, preliminary, generalization may be that in general individuals with an external LoC will
use less information, as their conception that they do not have influence on outcomes implies
that this information is of no use to them.
Proposition 1 Evaluators with an external locus of control will use less information, than
evaluators with an internal locus of control.
However, of the information used by externals a larger proportion will be external, as they need
this information to justify their external attributions. If the amount of external information
attended to is very large, this may even cause the previous proposition to become invalid.
Proposition la Evaluators with an external locus of control will place more emphasis on ex-
ternal information, rather than internal information, than evaluators with an internal locus of
control.
Managers with an internal LoC,  on the other hand, have better information processing ca-
pabilities and consequently may be able to use information with a broader scope (that is the
ratio of non-financial, external, process, future-oriented to financial, internal, outcome and
past-oriented information will be larger for managers with an internal LoC).
Proposition lb Evaluators with an internal locus of control will use information that has a
broader scope, than evaluators with an internal locus of control.
An important additional question with respect to LoC  is whether this variable is a useful
determinant of PMS characteristics at all. An interaction between LoC of individuals, and the
function they occupy in an organization may occur (see e.g., [2]  for some empirical evindence).
Individuals with an external LoC  may be less likely to choose a managerial occupation. Fur-
thermore, performance may influence LoC.  It has been observed [ 181  that a relation between
41n the context of CEO strategic planning similar observations have been made: ‘[i]n order, to garner the
information necessary to support strategic planning, internal [locus of control] CEOs  would implement monitoring
of the environment and set  up concomitant boundary-spanning structures and staff’  [  15,  p.  19.51.
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IQ and LoC exists, which is explained by the observation that smarter people are more able to
control outcomes. In a similar way better managers may be more able to control outcomes,
which may affect their LoC.  If either of those effects exists, this may seriously hamper the
usability of LoC  in explaining the characteristics of a PMS.
3.2 Need for achievement
Individuals with a high need for achievement value achievement as intrinsically rewarding. It
has been claimed [15]  that they tend to set moderate goals, take moderate risks, and prefer
frequent and concrete feedback about their performance. Focusing on CEO’s (in their function
of designers of PMS), Lewin and Stephens note:
CEOS provide employees with performance evaluation and reward systems that they feel would spur
themselves to good performance. CEOS  who are achievement oriented should thus favor highly
structured incentives, rewards, and performance appraisals because of their own need for forrnalized
means-ends mental maps and concrete goal-oriented feedback. [ 15, p. 1911
Although this paper investigates usage, rather than design of PMS, it seems acceptable to
claim that if managers provided with the freedom to design a system will follow their prefer-
ences, they will also follow those preferences when using a system that already exists, provided
that the system makes this possible. Consequently, the preferences mentioned by Lewin and
Stephens can be translated in one general proposition:
Proposition 2 Evaluators with a high need for achievement will use more information than
evaluators who score low on this characteristic.
It is possible to make this proposition more specific, by translating formalization into the use
of quantitative, rather than qualitative information.
Proposition 2a Evaluators with a high need for achievement will use more quantitative infor-
mation, rather than qualitative information, than evaluators who score low on this character-
istic.
Another consequence of the desire for formalization is, that the information will be used
rigidly, rather than flexibly, as this enhances the clarity of the means-ends relations mentioned
by Lewin and Stephens.
Proposition 2b Evaluators with a high need for achievement will use pegormance  measure-
ment information more rigidly than evaluators who score low on this characteristic.
On the other hand, the focus on a means-ends relation may also imply that managers with a
higher need for achievement want to know the means by which results have been obtained. In
other words, they are likely to put more emphasis on process information:
Proposition 2c  Managers with a high need for achievement will place more emphasis on pro-
cess rather than outcome information.
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3.3 Ambiguity tolerance
The definition of ambiguity tolerance (AT) has been subject to some debate (see e.g., [6,8,17])
in the academic literature. A debate that is mainly caused by ambiguity in the definition of AT.
Budner (cited by Das [4])  defines intolerance of ambiguity as ‘the tendency to perceive (i.e.
interpret) ambiguous situations as sources of threat’, whereas another early author in this area,
Frenkel-Brunswik, measures  ambiguity tolerance in terms of the ability to perceive ambiguity.
The difference between both operationalizations is recognized  by MacDonald [ 171,  who also
indicates that a more appropriate term for the construct assessed by the Frenkel-Brunswik AT
instrument would be rigidity. Consequently, some research findings that use the words ‘ambi-
guity tolerance’, but refer to the Frenkel-Brunswik operationalization, should be interpreted as
discussing rigidity. Lewin and Stephens, for instance, claim that
People with low tolerance for ambiguity [high rigidity] prefer to reduce complex issues to more
tractable forms, to deal with a minimum of information from the environment, and to resist change.
[. . . ] Since they do not feel compelled to know what their subordinates are doing at all times (thus
reducing ambiguity), they would not be expected to implement elaborate monitoring structures or to
‘micro manage’. [15,  p. 1961.
Rigid people, may not want to see conflicting information. Managers who are not ambiguity
tolerant, on the other hand, are likely to implement an elaborate monitoring system, in order to
reduce ambiguity resulting from a lack of sufficient information.
This latter statement is easily derived from the AT literature. Budner (quoted in [ 16, p. 2971)
defines an ambiguous situation ‘as one which cannot be adequately structured or categorized  by
the individual because of the lack of sufficient cues.’ He distinguishes three types of ambiguous
situations: completely novel situations, complex situations and contradictory situations (Bud-
ner, quoted in [ 161).  Individuals with a low tolerance for ambiguity, ‘being more troubled by
inconsistency than their ambiguity-tolerant counterparts, may attempt to resolve ambiguous sit-
uations by collecting more information’ [5,  p. 5 131.  Furthermore, they will show a preference
‘for readily interpretable stimuli. Thus, when evaluating the importance of information, they
may tend to judge factual data (e.g., expressed by numbers) to be more important than abstract
or conceptual data.’ [5,  p. 5131.  Individuals who score low on AT will gather more informa-
tion, unless they deem this information to be ambiguous [20].  Dermer’s [5]  results indicate
that individuals who are low on AT tend to indicate that a larger number of the information
items provided to them in his study is important, whereas at the same time a smaller number of
information items reflecting behavioral and future data is deemed important. This confirms the
expectation that low AT individuals will use more information, as long as in is not ambiguous.
Oliver and Flamholtz [20],  discussing HRM practices, notice the possibility of another pos-
sible effect of AT: individuals low on AT are supposed to oppose paradigm shifts and hence
to use less HRM information. A generalization of this observation would be that individuals
with low AT will stick to traditional sources of information, which will generally be accounting
information. Das [4],  finally showed that more AT is associated with more reliance on intrinsic
motivation, but not with less use of extrinsic motivation. Low AT may induce formalization and
rigidity in general.
Overall, the discussion above seems to indicate that managers who score low on AT, will
use more information in order to reduce ambiguity.
Proposition 3 Evaluators with low ambiguity tolerance will use more information than evalu-
ators with a high tolerance for ambiguity.
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It is possible to formulate some more specific propositions. Managers who are intolerant of
ambiguity are likely to prefer financial data, which is more traditional and communicates an
unambiguous message, over less unambiguously interpretable non-financial data in evaluating
the performance of managers and business units.
Proposition 3a Evaluators with low ambiguity tolerance will place more emphasis onjnan-
cial information, rather than non-jnancial information, than evaluators with a high tolerance
for ambiguity.
As qualitative information is most ambiguous and the least traditional information source, it is
expected that low AT individuals will prefer quantitative information.
Proposition 3b Evaluators with low ambiguity tolerance will place more emphasis on quanti-
tative information, rather than qualitative information, than evaluators with a high tolerance
for ambiguity.
3.4 Risk taking propensity
A final personality characteristic of supervising managers that may influence their information
usage is the extent to which they are able or willing to take risks. Managers with low risk
taking propensity, will gather more information in order to reduce uncertainty [23].  In a similar
vein, Lewin and Stephen, in a paper also quoted in earlier sections of this paper, remark that
‘[C]EOS  with low risk taking propensity will tend to implement centralized  organization designs
characterized  by high control intensity and direct supervision in order to minimize uncertainty
and avoid surprises’ [15,  p. 1971.  This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Evaluators with low risk taking propensity will use more information than man-
agers with a high risk taking propensity
To avoid uncertainty, managers with low risk taking propensity may delve into detailed opera-
tional data, rather than outcome data alone.
Proposition 4a Evaluators with low risk taking propensity will place more emphasis on pro-
cess information, rather than outcome information, than managers with a high risk taking
propensity.
3.5 Experience in domain of evaluatee
Experience of the evaluator in the domain of the evaluatee combines two effects that may have
an opposite influence on information usage. On the one hand, this experience may provide
the evaluator with more insight into the functioning of the business unit subject to evaluation.
Consequently, more non-financial and in particular more process information will be used.
Managers with less experience may prefer financial information, because of the fact that this
kind of information brings the activities of the evaluatees and their business units under a com-
mon denominator, which is interpretable without detailed knowledge of the underlying primary
processes. On the other hand, the evaluatee is likely to be a manager, as well, which implies that
experience in the domain of the evaluatee also leads to more managerial experience. Findings
of Beyer et al. show that ‘[mlanagers’  functional experience tends to narrow their cognitive
processing’ [l, p. 7301:  information attended to and amount of problems identified decrease.
Consequently, although the total amount of information used may diminish, the proportion of
non-financial information used for performance evaluation will increase.
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Proposition 5 Evaluators with previous experience in the function of the evaluatee will place
more emphasis on non-Jinancial  information, rather than financial information than managers
without this experience.
More specifically, it is expected that the usage of process, rather than outcome data will in-
crease .
Proposition 5a Evaluators with previous experience in the function of the evaluatee will place
more emphasis on process information, rather than outcome evaluation than managers without
this experience.
3.6 The way the evaluator is evaluated
In terms of the PMS framework presented in Figure 1, the way the evaluator is evaluated may
more strictly be seen as a part of the context of the evaluation, however, as it has been treated in
the context of evaluative style research, it will be treated here, as well. Hopwood [9]  observed
that a manager who is evaluated by a superior with a given evaluative style, will tend to pass
down this style to his own subordinates. This observation may be generalized to the usage of
information for performance evaluation in general. As evaluators will themselves be evaluated
on certain information items, they will also use those items in evaluating their subordinates.
Proposition 6 Evaluators will tend to use the criteria on which they themselves are evaluated
to evaluate their own subordinates.
4 Discussion
This paper tried to find explanations for differences in PMS practice in similar circumstances by
looking at the possibility that idiosyncrasies of the evaluating managers imply preferences for
certain information, how rigidly or flexibly this information is used, and how much information
is used. Propositions were derived and the discussion in general indicates that personality
characteristics, previous experience and the way managers themselves are evaluated provide
reasonable explanations for those differences. However, empirical research in this area is scarce
and some of the predictions are contradictory. An external locus of control for instance is
supposed to have a negative influence of the amount of information used in general. However,
this same external locus of control is supposed to have a positive influence on the amount of
external information used, and this increase may well be larger than the decrease mentioned
earlier. It is necessary to limit the propositions to the relative importance assigned along the
information dimensions. Similarly, experience of the manager in the function of the evaluatee
may well be positively related to managerial experience. In particular in higher management
echelons this will be the case. This, again results in contradictory statements: experience
in general tends to show a negative relation to information usage, whereas experience in the
domain of the evaluatee is likely to show a positive influence to the amount of information used
and in particular the usage of non-financial and process information. Again, it is necessary to
retreat to a statement about the relative importance of different kinds of information.
Another important issue is the possible occurrence of interactions between the personality
type of an individual and the characteristics of the function this individual will occupy. In-
tuitively, it seems far from impossible that certain functions and certain organizations attract
individuals with characteristics that best fit that function or organization. Possible ways in
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which such matching may occur are ‘survival of the fittest’ (individuals with high risk taking
propensity are less likely to flourish managing part of a CPA firm) and the desire of the indi-
viduals to avoid situations in which they are not at ease (e.g., a manager with low ambiguity
tolerance who is responsible for a department carrying out fundamental research) or be attracted
by situations fitting their personality (managerial tasks seem suited to individuals with a high
need for achievement, but less ideal for individuals with an external locus of control). Although
managers definitely will differ, the difference within a group of managers may be smaller than
the differences between managers and the general population. Furthermore, situations requir-
ing an emphasis on certain information items (e.g., process information) may attract managers
that tend to use this information, further obfuscating the situation. Although the practical im-
portance of the influences mentioned in this paper only increases, when the latter speculation is
true (knowledge about data requirements in prospective functions and the tendency of an indi-
vidual to use this information may for instance be used in an assessment procedure), research
possibilities either have to deal with limited variation in the data (and hence a relatively large
amount of error) or have to been carried out in a laboratory situation, which may lower exter-
nal validity of the research findings. Another problem likely to be encountered in empirical
studies is the interaction between personality characteristics of the evaluator and response pat-
terns. It is, e.g., not unlikely that ambiguity tolereance  will influence perceived environmental
uncertainty, which may in turn be related to information needs, which hopefully are related to
information usage. This brings me to the final remark of this paper: the discussion in this paper
has been limited to the influence of characteristics of the evaluator on PMS usage and should
not be read to imply that the relation between the other characteristics described in Figure 1 or
the design of PMS, or the relation between PMS characteristics should be neglected.
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